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Among the many items online retailers sell, some stand out as best sellers and are often sold at considerable discounts. Best seller discounting
can encourage customer trafﬁc and the purchase of a basket of other products in the same transaction. Although most studies treat retailers as
symmetric, the cross-selling potential is generally asymmetric across retailers, since some online retailers have more products to sell. In addition,
the cross-selling effect works both ways — customers intending to buy a best seller may buy other items in their shopping basket, while other
customers intending to buy a basket may buy a best seller while visiting the retailer. The authors model the pricing implications of this rich variety
of asymmetric cross-selling, with both best sellers and typical baskets acting as trafﬁc generators and cross-sold products. The common wisdom
that loss leader pricing leads to neither a signiﬁcant increase in store trafﬁc nor an increase in proﬁts does not apply in an asymmetric case where
one retailer has more products to cross-sell. The cross-selling potential of products even far down the best seller list is demonstrated. Empirical
analyses provide support for key ﬁndings of the theoretical model using book pricing and sales rank data from multiple online retailers.
© 2017




















On October 22, 2009, the American Booksellers Association
sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) accusing
Amazon.com, Wal-Mart, and Target of illegal predatory pricing.
These three retailers had sold ten hardcover new releases,
including best sellers by James Patterson, John Grisham, and
Stephen King, for less than $9, though such books typically retail
between $25 and $35 (Trachtenberg 2009). The letter also
reported that publishers were not offering special terms to these
retailers, so the titles were being sold below cost. Taking issue
with this claim, The Wall Street Journal Law Blog commented
that retailers setting prices below profit-making levels was not a
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(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intmar.2017.09.001Genercompetition (Jones 2009). Promoting and selling the top-ten titles
below cost represented a loss leader strategy to draw in customers
who might purchase other titles or merchandise.
The DOJ case focused on 10 best sellers, but we also
observe strong price competition for many products with even
far lower sales ranks. News reports in October 2009 suggested
that Wal-Mart was already offering up to 200 best sellers
for 50% off their list price (Reisinger 2009). Amazon.com
typically lists 100 books at considerable discounts under its
“Best Sellers in Books” list. In other product categories, more
than 500 generic prescription drugs are offered either for
free (e.g., antibiotics at Publix and Meijer) or for only $4 for
a month's supply (e.g., Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target) (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2011). Amazon.com even
provides sales ranks of books up to 10 million, similar to buy.
com and other sites that track and report the sales ranks of
almost all products offered for sale online. Retailers recognize
that many products are able to generate some degree of traffic









































































































1 Li, Gu, and Liu (2013) analyze asymmetry in a retailer cross-selling, but the
asymmetry is binary in that a retailer either cross-sells or it doesn't.
2 While we use “best seller” to indicate a trafﬁc-generating product, other
research uses similar labels of “loss leader” or “shopping good.” We use loss
leader to reﬂect a best seller product priced below cost. A composite good
“basket” in our study represents one or more items purchased in addition to a
focal best seller item.








Given the observed richness of price discounting across
hundreds of items, we aim to clarify the pricing implications of
the traffic generation potential for products with diverse sales
ranks. We model and empirically examine price discounting
strategies for online retailers. Although our model has application
to retail competition more generally, the online pricing issues are
more pertinent for several reasons. First, although products at the
top of best seller lists are clear traffic generators and prime
candidates for loss leader pricing, many products with lower sales
ranks also exhibit some traffic generation potential. In other
words, “best seller” is not so much a category as it is a matter of
degree. Considering that an online retailer can offer millions of
items, the retail pricing decision is much more complex since
even less popular items may generate at least some traffic and
cross-selling potential, prompting an online retailer to consider
how to best discount such items. A key question thus emerges:
What is the price discounting implication of the diminishing
but positive traffic generation potential of products farther
down the best seller ranks? Second, if a best seller is meant
to generate traffic and sales of other products, then retailer size
may be an important variable. Some retailers are bigger than
others in that they offer more products for customers to purchase.
Such asymmetric competition means that some retailers can
benefit more from best seller discounting since the opportunity
for cross-selling is bigger. Online stores have achieved very
large assortments, so consideration of shopping basket size
is important for online retailing. How do price discounting
strategies and cross-selling vary with a retailer's size of the
typical shopping basket it sells? Third, the psychological and
economic motivations to visit a retailer and be cross-sold can
be more prevalent in an online setting. The large product
assortment can impact traffic for the online retailer and be an
important basis of differentiation (Pan, Shankar, and Ratchford
2002; Ratchford 2009). Online recommendations for other
items to purchase during online shopping introduce prolific
cross-selling opportunities, including instances where a best
seller is the product being cross-sold. How are price discounting
strategies affected when additional shopping items or a best
seller may be cross-sold to different shoppers? Finally, offering
lower prices may be more prevalent and important for online
retailers compared to brick-and-mortar stores (Pan, Shankar,
and Ratchford 2002). Ratchford (2009) suggest that online
price dispersion deserves additional explanations, particularly in
relation to “heterogeneity in services” such as the product variety
offered by retailers. Our study of cross-selling with asymmetric
retailer size adds new insights to online price discounting
strategies.
Given these important online pricing issues, we pose several
research questions:
1. How do competing, profit-maximizing retailers determine
price discounts for best sellers?
2. How does the loss-leading price of best sellers depend on
retailer size?
3. How do retailers price best sellers and traffic generators of
varying ranks?








Current marketing literature is limited on the first two
research questions and absent on the rest, even though these
questions are crucial to understanding the retail dilemma of
which items to price higher or lower and when. The 2009 case
about best-selling books reveals that not all retailers can offer
the same lowest price. If the optimal (loss leader) price of a best
seller is not the same across retailers, on what does it depend?
Can a retailer with relatively smaller basket sizes offer the same
loss leader prices as a larger basket-size retailer?
To examine these questions, our model includes two main
characteristics of realistic retailer cross-selling activity gener-
ally ignored in prior research. First, retailers are asymmetric
in that they vary in how many products they sell, meaning that
their cross-selling capabilities differ.1 Second, cross-selling is
not a one-way activity where a customer buys a single best
seller and then buys another basket of items while visiting the
retailer. Some customers intending to buy a typical shopping
basket may be cross-sold a best seller.
We examine the price discounting strategies of multiproduct
retailers that incorporate these cross-selling characteristics. We
use the term “best seller” to refer to any product with a higher
potential to generate traffic for the retailer than a product lower
down the sales rank.2 We analyze a model in which best sellers
can lead to the cross-sale of a basket of goods, just as the sale of
a shopping basket can lead to the cross-sale of a best seller. An
online retailer might be willing to reduce the price of a best
seller if it would lead to cross-selling opportunities, but it also
wants to increase the price of the best seller to the degree that
it is cross-sold to buyers of other items. We show that the loss
leader prices of best sellers depend critically on the typical
basket size of a retailer. This finding explains why big-box
retailers, such as Amazon.com, can offer discounts that cannot
be matched by smaller retailers. We examine the boundary
conditions of this phenomenon, and provide empirical evidence
with online book pricing data that supports key propositions
from our model: price discounts positively correlate with sales
rank (even far down the best seller list), best sellers with low list
prices are discounted more, and large basket retailers offer
deeper discounts on the top best sellers.
Best Seller Discounts and Loss Leaders
Best sellers are books for which demand vastly exceeds
what is then considered to be large sales (Steinberg 1996).
Recent research has uncovered three major content reasons a
book becomes a best seller: (1) its main themes, (2) symmetric
plot with 3-act structure, and (3) everyday language (Archer
and Jockers 2016). Becoming a best seller is also driven by
the reputation of the author, gatekeepers such as publishing

























































































































word-of-mouth networks, advertising, and a host of techniques
to become included in best seller lists (Hill and Power 2005).
Price is not considered a key driver of becoming a best seller
because book prices are low compared to consumer budgets in
mature markets. However, discounted or even loss leader
pricing may influence shopping traffic.
Loss leader pricing has been the subject of considerable
research in marketing. Hess and Gerstner (1987) were the first
to employ a formal model of loss leaders. Lal and Matutes
(1994) explain many facets of loss leader pricing, including
Walters and MacKenzie's (1988) empirical finding that on
average it leads to neither a significant increase in store traffic
nor an increase in profits (in a supermarket setting). Our model
findings are parallel to Lal and Matutes (1994) in some
respects. However, our model captures asymmetries in both
products and retailers, which enables us to show that the
classic finding of no significant increases in traffic and profits
holds only for the symmetric retailer case. When there is
asymmetry among online retailers, the retailer with a marginal
advantage in benefiting from cross-selling can increase both
traffic and profits, compared with a smaller retailer with weaker
cross-selling potential.
DeGraba (2006) considers loss leader pricing as a way
to capture high-profit customers. He shows that by offering
discounts on products that are more likely to be purchased by
high-profit customers, loss leader pricing can price discriminate
in a competitive setting. Our model approach is similar in
that the profit potential of a shopping basket determines the
pricing of traffic-generating best sellers. The competitive
bundling literature also deals with a similar problem, such as
Balachander, Ghosh, and Stock (2010) who combine bundle
discounts and price promotions in a model of cross-category
bundling.
In a brick and mortar setting, absent price communication,
the consumer is at the risk of zero consumer surplus, because
the retailer could price the products at the reservation price
given the consumer has already incurred the sunk travel cost.
Signaling low prices on some products is suggested to be a
solution to this setback (Lal and Matutes 1994). Simester
(1995) also argues advertised prices may signal the efficiency
of the retailer and her low marginal costs and hence low prices
on unadvertised products. Signaling with low prices can thus
lead to increased store traffic. This rationale however, does not
apply to an online setting, since sunk travel costs are minimal
and price information is typically available for most items. For
online retailing, other factors such as product variety (retailer
size asymmetry) may be at play for cross-selling and loss leader
pricing.
Researchers have also extensively examined online and
offline price dispersion (Ancarani and Shankar 2004; Bakos
1997; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004; Brynjolfsson and
Smith 2000; Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff 2001; Pan, Ratchford,
and Shankar 2004; Pan, Shankar, and Ratchford 2002, 2003;
Ratchford, Pan, and Shankar 2003). Ambrus and Weinstein
(2008) show that equilibrium loss leaders can occur with
positive profits if there are certain demand complementarities








and Ellison (2005) and Ratchford (2009) provide thorough
reviews of prices and price dispersions in electronic commerce.
Our work concentrates on the lower bound of prices (loss leader
pricing and discounts) which we claim to be a function of the
traffic generation potential of products. Furthermore, our work
is among a few (Chen and Hitt 2003; Kocas and Bohlmann
2008; Smith 2002) where retailers play asymmetric mixed
strategies of temporary “randomized” price discounting that
produce online price dispersion. The mixed strategy pricing
equilibria of competing firms are reflected through observed
temporal price discounting and dispersion (Narasimhan 1988;
Ratchford 2009; Varian 1980) across multiple products and
retailers (see also Iyer and Pazgal 2003; Raju, Srinivasan, and
Lal 1990). Actual pricing data represent repeated observations
of a mixed pricing strategy over time.
Our work shares the mixed strategy equilibrium interpreta-
tion of temporary price discounts with the preceding research.
However, our study is unique in that it does not rely on the
dynamics of loyal and switcher customer groups, but rather
on cross-selling. We utilize DeGraba's (2006) perspective that
the profit potential of a cross-sold composite good (basket)
determines the pricing of the best seller, but we do so via the
approach of probabilistic retailer pricing strategies advocated
byVarian (1980) andNarasimhan (1988).We compare symmetric
with asymmetric cases and show that the profit potential of
basket sizes shapes the price discounting equilibria. Our work
thereby bridges the research streams of loss leaders and com-
petitive price promotions by examining cross-selling pricing
strategies in a single framework. Our discounted pricing model
allows us to also determine when loss leader pricing will apply
to a best seller.
Online Cross-selling and Baskets of Goods
Amazon's super saver free shipping is truly a piece of
marketing genius. It works on the premise that people will
buy more items in the same order just to achieve the free
shipping. I can admit that I ﬁnd myself doing just that
on a constant basis. Every time I go to Amazon to buy a
$15 DVD, I will likely buy another $10 item just to get to
that $25. There is something endlessly satisfying about
getting the items you want without having to pay those nasty
extra fees.
(May 20, 2008, anonymous Internet posting)
Consider a typical online shopping experience, in which a
customer shops for a new or best seller product (book, DVD,
CD, console game). The customer may visit her favorite
retailer's site or visit a price comparison site first to view the
range of prices available for the item. She could visit the
online seller that offers the product at the lowest price, or
consider just a short list of favorite retailers and choose the
retailer that offers the lowest price. When the item enters
the shopping basket on the online store's website, a variety of
forces then push the customer to purchase other items. She
may get free shipping if she spends just $5 more, remember a









































































































a suggestion for yet another book (or even an unrelated item)
by a content or collaborative filter-based recommender system
(Fleder and Hosanagar 2009).
Beyond arguments arising from total costs of shopping
(e.g., processing and shipping), psychological factors may
also lead to additional item purchases. Dhar, Huber, and Khan
(2007) define the term “shopping momentum effect” as the
inertia to continue purchasing unplanned items after an initial
purchase, independent of the economies-of-scale arguments.
Heilman, Nakamoto, and Rao (2002) and Stilley, Inman, and
Wakefield (2010b) also show that unexpected savings on planned
items can create a psychological windfall effect, leading to an
increased purchase of unplanned items.
These psychological and economic effects of a sales pro-
motion on the size and composition of the shopping basket
are diverse; promotional items attract both cherry-pickers
with very small baskets and customers who eventually purchase
large baskets3 (Dhar, Huber, and Khan 2007; McAlister, George,
and Chien 2009; Stilley, Inman, and Wakefield 2010a). Mulhern
and Padgett (1995) find that more than three-fourths of shoppers
who based store choice on promoted items spent even more
money on other regularly-priced items. The overall implication
is that cross-selling can cut both ways. Shoppers who are mainly
interested in a “best seller” may impulse buy one or more items
(a basket). We label this successful cross-selling as “conversion.”
Also, a buyer not necessarily interested in a best seller may, in
addition to purchasing the planned shopping basket, also buy a
best seller. We label this cross-selling as an “inclusion.”
Given the wide variety of items offered by online retailers,
and the widespread occurrence of purchase recommendations
and impulse buying, any model of online price discounting
should consider the different types of realistic cross-selling
opportunities. Unlike prior research, we consider both types
of cross-selling in our pricing model. Further, given the role of
the shopping basket in cross-selling, online price discounting
for the best seller must consider that online retailers can
differ greatly in the items they offer to sell. In other words,
asymmetry in the shopping basket size among online retailers
means some retailers will benefit from cross-selling more
than others, with important implications for the optimum best
seller price discounting strategy. Our model therefore focuses
on retailer asymmetry under cross-selling, making a unique
contribution to the online pricing literature.
We focus on the traffic generation potential of discounted
best sellers and consolidate the diverse effects of cross-selling
by introducing an “effective rate of average baskets sold.”
Suppose m customers are drawn to a retailer to purchase the
best seller. Some of these customers will buy only the best
seller, while others will be successfully cross-sold a basket of
size xi, i = 1 to m, where xi=0 if the customer buys only the
best seller. Instead of modeling a large series of basket sizes
purchased (x1, x2,…xm), we can easily express an effective rate373
3 McAlister, George, and Chien (2009) report the basket size distribution of a
supermarket; the range is 1 to 130, the distribution is skewed (60% of the
baskets contain fewer than ten items) and average basket size is around ten
items.








of cross-selling conversion relative to a retailer j's average






The effective rate of average baskets sold α simply captures
the degree of cross-selling conversion by the retailer, equiva-
lently scaled by a measure of the retailer's average basket size (s).
A retailer with higher α is more successful at cross-selling
conversion sales. The effective rate of average baskets sold also
allows us to convert the distribution of additional items sold into
an effective Bernoulli distribution that has just two outcomes: an
α probability that a customer is cross-sold an average basket, and
a (1−α) probability that the customer buys the promoted best
seller item but no additional items.
In the next section, we analyze and compare a symmetric
and an asymmetric duopoly of retailers, in which retailers can
sell a best seller and a composite good (average basket) to
potential customers. We also provide empirical support for the
model's findings, using book pricing and sales rank data from
Amazon.com, as well as pricing data from 18 other retailers.
Model
We consider a 2 × 2 × 2 market with two retailers (R1 and
R2) selling two products (A and B) to two customer segments
(n shoppers of A, and N shoppers of B). Let good A be a best
seller (book, CD, DVD, or console game) that creates traffic
for retailers. Let good B be an average basket. Similar to other
models (DeGraba 2006; Li, Gu, and Liu 2013) the two
segments reflect two types of customers that differ in how
they choose a retailer — n shoppers visit a retailer intending to
purchase best seller A, and N shoppers visit a retailer intending
to purchase product basket B. Cross-selling opportunities exist
for both segments, whether conversion (best seller buyers also
purchase basket B) or inclusion (basket buyers also purchase
best seller A). Variables used in the model are defined and
summarized in Table 1.
Retailers and Products
The retailers choose prices for the best seller product,
strategically considering competitor prices. We assume a
one-shot simultaneous-move game for the price choice of the
best seller A to maximize profits, similar to Varian (1980)
and Narasimhan (1988). R1 has the price couple (a1, b1) for
products A and B, and R2 has the price couple (a2, b2). In
determining prices of two goods, Lal and Matutes (1994) show
that the non-loss leader good is priced at the exogenous
reservation price. We therefore keep the price of the average
basket exogenous to the model to better assess the price
dependence of best seller A on the average basket.4 Initially, we4 The solution when both prices are endogenous is highly involved. Beard and
Stern (2008) examine a similar 2 × 2 × 2 model and acknowledge that such
models are complex and that general formulations are likely to be intractable.











































































Variables and definitions used in the model.t1:2
t1:3 αi Effective rate of average baskets sold as a result of the sale of product
i, i = a or b
t1:4 m Number of customers in the calculation of the effective rate
t1:5 xi Number of items in the basket of the ith customer, i = 1 to m,
t1:6 s Retailer's average basket size
t1:7 Ri Retailer i, i = 1 or 2
t1:8 ai Price of the bestseller (product A) at Retailer i, i = 1 or 2
t1:9 bi Price of the average basket (product B) at Retailer i, i = 1 or 2
t1:10 n Number of price comparison shoppers of the bestseller (product A)
t1:11 N Number of shoppers of an average basket (product B)
t1:12 r Reservation price of the bestseller (product A)
t1:13 Eπi The expected profit of Retailer i, i = 1 or 2
t1:14 Fi[a] Cumulative distribution function of price of the bestseller (product A)
at Retailer i, i = 1 or 2
t1:15 amin Lowest possible quoted price of the bestseller (product A) in the
mixed strategy
t1:16 α/β The conversion-to-inclusion ratio αa=αb
t1:17 bsym The average basket size under retailer symmetry
t1:18 Fsym[a] Cumulative distribution function of price of the bestseller (product A)
in the symmetric case
t1:19 Fiasym[a] Cumulative distribution function of price of the bestseller (product A)
in the asymmetric case at Retailer i, i = 1 or 2








assume a symmetric duopoly in which R1 and R2 are similar in
terms of the price value of their average basket (b1=b2=b). We
then relax this assumption to analyze an asymmetric case in
which one retailer has an average basket larger than the other
retailer. Without loss of generality, we assume no fixed costs
and zero marginal cost.5
Customers
Two groups of buyers visit the retailers in this model.
1. There are n customers who price compare for product A, the
best seller, and buy it at the retailer that offers it for less as
long as the price is below their reservation price r. If prices
a1 and a2 are equivalent, both retailers share n customers
equally. To capture conversions among the n customers, we
assume an effective rate of average baskets sold, as defined
previously, equal to αa. This is akin to assuming that there is
an αa probability (0bαa≤1) that any given customer in this
segment will convert to purchasing an average basket. Thus,
an (effective) αa proportion of this segment, nαa, also buys
an average basket. The αa parameter captures the conversion
incidence (Lam et al. 2001).
2. There are N other customers who shop for product basket B,
and buy it at the retailer where it is available for the lower
price. These customers do not have any preferences for
either retailer, and because we assume under the symmetric
case that the price of the average basket is identical, both
retailers share the N customers equally (we later discuss
the asymmetric case). To capture inclusions among the N
customers, there is an αb probability (0bαb≤1) that any5 Although larger retailers may enjoy cost efﬁciencies, our model shows that
the larger retailer can be strategically motivated to lower prices even without
any simplistic cost advantage.








given customer in this segment will also purchase the best
seller.6 Thus, Nαb customers also buy product A from the
same retailer. The αb parameter captures the inclusion
incidence (McAlister, George, and Chien 2009).
For expositional simplicity and to establish the intuition
behind our results, we present the case when αa=αb=α in
the main part of the article. We then present the equilibria
for αa≠αb and discuss them subsequently. Our equilibrium
solutions for optimum price discounting follow standard mixed
strategy mechanics (Kocas and Bohlmann 2008; Narasimhan
1988; Ratchford 2009; Varian 1980) under the absence of pure
strategies. The mixed-strategy pricing solution is reflected as
a probability distribution of the best seller discounted prices,
which we term the “price promotion strategy” for the retailer.
The highest price in the distribution represents no discount,
while lower prices reflect a discount.
Symmetric Case
The general profit function of retailer Ri is given by:
Eπi ¼ n ai þ αbð ÞProb ai b a j
 þ N bþ αaið Þ 12 ð2Þ
The term n(ai+αb)Prob(aibaj) is the sum of profits from
the sale of the best seller to n customers and the profits from
the sale of an average basket to αn customers when aibaj.
The term Nðbþ αaiÞ 12 is the sum of the profit from the
sale of the average basket to N/2 customers and the profit
from the sale of the best seller to αN/2 customers. Denoting
Fj[a] as the cumulative distribution function of Rj's prices
for good A, we can rewrite the profit function for Ri as
Eπi ¼ nðaþ αbÞð1−Fj½aÞ þ Nðbþ αaÞ 12.
P1. The symmetric retailers' profit-maximizing price promotion
strategy is given by amixed strategy equilibrium of price discounts.
The best seller price distribution is given by ½a ¼ 1− Nαðr−aÞ2nðaþbαÞ. The
resulting symmetric equilibrium profit is Eπ ¼ NðbþαrÞ2 . (Proofs are
provided in Appendix A).
No pure strategy equilibrium exists in this one-shot game.
The tension between the desire to lower prices of traffic
generators and the desire to increase their prices when part
of high-margin baskets leads to mixed strategy discounting
of the best seller, in which lower prices are more likely; that
is, ∂ f ½a∂a b 0 for all a∈{amin, r}. For ease of interpretation we can
set r = 1, such that the bestseller price (a) can be interpreted as
a fraction of the highest “regular” price— any price that is less
than one reflects a discount. Fig. 1 illustrates the distribution
functions for the best seller price under specific parameter
values, showing a considerable occurrence of loss leader prices
(a is negative). Such tension under symmetric competition can6 Because the cross-sold item is a single best seller, the sales distribution of
the success (sale of the best seller) is already a Bernoulli distribution, and
therefore the effective rate is equal to the nominal proportion αb.
















































Fig. 1. The symmetric mixed strategy equilibria: probability and cumulative distributions for best seller price a under parameter values br ¼ 5, nN ¼ :5, r=1, AND
α= .5.
a) CDF as Relative Traffic Generation Potential  Varies 
b) CDF as Relative Average Basket Size  Varies 






































Fig. 2. Comparative statics of the cumulative distribution function.








be severe, and as P1 indicates the expected profit is equivalent
to the profit the retailer would make if it priced the best seller
high at r and lost all n customers to the other retailer, selling
the average basket to N2 and the best seller to α
N
2 customers.
Therefore, we can conclude that in the case of a symmetric
duopoly, the discounts offered on the best seller do not raise
profits, consistent with the work of Walters and MacKenzie
(1988) and Lal and Matutes (1994). Our analysis also provides
support for these authors' insights into the lack of increase in
traffic. Because of symmetry, the customer traffic remains the
same at nþN2 .
P2. In the symmetric retailer equilibrium, loss leader pricing
can occur if the retailer's incentives to discount, through
larger basket size and traffic generation potential, are large
enough. The lowest quotable price is given by amin ¼ Nrα−2nbαNαþ2n .








r is the relative average basket size compared
with the reservation price of the best seller and nN is the relative
traffic generation potential of the best seller compared with the
average basket.
Fig. 2 provides a visual analysis of the comparative statics
of discounting in our model. Panel A depicts the cumulative
distribution function of the mixed strategy best seller prices for
different values of the traffic generation potential of the best
seller, nN. As the traffic generation potential of the best seller
increases (a larger segment size n gives more opportunity to
cross-sell the basket), the lower bound of the support shifts to
the left and allows for deeper price cuts, while the percentage
of prices below cost increases. We test this finding as H1 in
the “Empirical Support” section. The relative average basket
size compared with the reservation price of the best seller has a
similar effect on the distribution of prices. As br increases, so
does the frequency of loss-leading prices and the depth of the
discounts (see Fig. 2, Panel B). Markets with larger basket sizes
experience deeper discounts. Given similar traffic generation
potential, the lower-priced items are more likely to be loss
leaders. This finding partially explains why staple items with
relatively lower base prices are more likely to be loss leaders.
We also test these finding as H2 and H3 in our empirical














































































































that a best seller can be priced below cost if either its traffic
generation potential is great enough or the revenue potential
with respect to the average basket it could cross-sell is high
enough.
What happens to the best seller price a as the cross-selling
rate α changes? As Fig. 2 Panel C shows, α does not affect
the frequency of below-cost (loss-leading) prices but rather
the depth of loss-leading discounts. Only through considering
probabilistic pricing strategies can we effectively distinguish
the depth and frequency of pricing discounts. Greater cross-
selling potential leads to deeper loss leader discounts. The
frequency of below-cost discounts is given by Pðab 0Þ ¼
Fð0Þ ¼ 1− N r2 nb, which is independent of α. This finding,
however, holds only when the inclusion incidence of an
item is similar to its conversion incidence (αa =αb =α).We
now consider the case when the cross-selling incidences
are different, providing additional insight into loss leader
pricing.
When Inclusion Incidence Is Different fromConversion Incidence
The conversion and inclusion cross-selling rates may differ
in some retail settings. For example, for seasonal items such as
turkeys at Thanksgiving or eggs at Easter, the conversion rate
is probably higher than the inclusion rate; that is, customers go
shopping for these particular items rather than simply happening
to buy these items on shopping trips initiated by other needs.
The results, summarized in Appendix B, show that the optimal
frequency of discounts should be higher for items with con-
version rates higher than the inclusion rates. Formally, we
use the notations αa=α and αb=β and define α/β as the
conversion-to-inclusion ratio. The frequency of discounts for the
best seller price (a) when α≠β is given by F½a ¼ 1− Nβðr−aÞ2nðaþbαÞ .
This frequency is higher for products with higher conversion-
to-inclusion ratios, α/β, such as seasonal items. This finding
provides an analytical explanation to the empirical generalization
that seasonal items are discounted heavily (Chevalier, Kashyap,
and Rossi 2003).
Asymmetric Case
Without loss of generality, assume that b1Nb2, all else being
equal, such that R1 has a larger average basket size. We expect
that as a result of this asymmetry, R1 has potentially more to
gain from cross-selling and is motivated to offer deeper price
cuts on the best seller than R2.
To focus on basket size asymmetry (b1Nb2) rather than on
customer segment size asymmetry, we assume in our discussion
that N customers are shared equally by both retailers; that is,
N1 ¼ N2 ¼ N2. We provide an analysis of the case when N1≠N2
in Appendix C. We again assume that αa=αb=α.
P3. The profit-maximizing distribution of best seller prices
for the retailer with the larger average basket size, R1, is given
by the mixed strategy F1½a ¼ 1− Nαðr−aÞ2nðaþb2αÞ, and the bounds are








P4. The retailer with the smaller average basket size, R2, has a
higher average price than R1. Although R2 has equal discount
depths as R1, the frequency of discounts is lower for R2, with
a mass M ¼ αðb1−b2Þrþαb1 at r. The profit-maximizing distribution of
prices for R2 is given by the mixed strategy:
F2 a½  ¼ 1−Nα r−að Þ þ 2Mn r þ b1αð Þ
2n aþ b1αð Þ ¼
2n aþ b2αð Þ þ Nα r−að Þ
2n aþ b1αð Þ :
ð3Þ
The analysis of the asymmetric case helps explain the
pricing dynamics of our opening vignette. Because they offer
products in many categories and subcategories, mass merchan-
disers such as Amazon.com and Wal-Mart achieve average
basket sizes larger than other sellers, whether online or offline.
Their larger potential profit margin, due to their larger average
basket sizes, motivates and allows them to offer deeper
discounts on the most anticipated best sellers. From P4 we
indeed expect the larger retailers to engage in loss leader
pricing more frequently for a given set of items (see Fig. 3).
Although a retailer with a smaller average basket size can offer
similarly deep discounts, it can do so only less frequently or
on fewer items given it has less to gain in a cross-selling
conversion of a smaller basket. Thus, as P3 and P4 demonstrate,
the larger average basket size retailer R1 can grant (1) a deeper
average discount on a given set of items than R2, (2) the same
discounts on the same items as R2 but more frequently, and
(3) the same discounts on more items than R2. We will also
demonstrate (P5) that such an advantage leads not only to lower
prices but also to increases in R1's profits.
We note that four properties of the symmetric case remain
valid for the asymmetric case: (1) the minimum and average
prices decrease as nN increases; (2) the minimum and average
prices for the best seller decrease as br increases, though only
b2, the smaller average basket size, determines this ratio for
both retailers; (3) a higher valued cross-selling parameter α
increases the discount depths while leaving the frequency of
discounts unchanged; and (4) loss leader prices are possible.
Next, we compare the retailer profits and range and
frequency of prices across the symmetric and asymmetric
duopolies with three propositions. Note that the default profit
of a retailer is the profit it would make if it exclusively served
the N2 customers with the average basket and the
N
2 α customers
with the best seller priced at r.
P5. The asymmetric equilibrium leads to higher profits for the
larger retailer R1 than for R2. The profit of R2 is its default at
π2 ¼ Nðb2þαrÞ2 , and the profit of R1 is more than its default at
Eπ1 ¼ Nðb1þαrÞ2 þ nαðb1−b2Þ.
In the asymmetric case, R1 improves its profit by nα(b1−b2).
That is, commanding a larger basket size improves the profitability
of the larger basket retailer. The traffic implications are also
promising for this larger basket retailer. Formally:
P6. In the asymmetric equilibrium the larger retailer R1 enjoys
































































Retailer 1 has larger average basket size (b1>b2) 













Prior research has demonstrated that loss leader pricing leads
to neither a significant increase in store traffic nor an increase in
profits (Lal and Matutes 1994; Walters and MacKenzie 1988).
As P1 shows, this argument holds in the symmetric duopoly
case. However, P5 and P6 demonstrate that asymmetry between
retailers leads to both increased profits and increased traffic for
the retailer with the marginal advantage from cross-selling. The
other retailer loses traffic, and its profit is unchanged.
The retailer asymmetry also has important implications on
the pricing strategies. For comparison purposes, assume that
relative to the average basket size under retailer symmetry
(bsym), the asymmetric case has b1NbsymNb2. The asymmetry
has the effect of lessening the overall severity of price com-
petition between the two retailers. Formally,
P7. The severity of price competition is greater for symmetric
retailers than under asymmetry in average basket size. Formally,
assume b1NbsymNb2. Then, Fsym[a]NF1asym[a]NF2asym[a].
In the asymmetric case, the dominance of the larger retailer
R1 enables it to offer lower prices than R2. This asymmetry
forces R2 to retreat to offering less frequent, less deep price
discounts. Consequently, R1 follows suit and offers discounts
only as deep as those offered by R2 at a higher frequency
or, equivalently, on a greater number of products. Hence,
discounts are shallower in the asymmetric case compared to the
symmetric case (see Fig. 4). When retailers have similar basket
sizes, severity of the competition leads to lower minimum and
average prices. Recall that P5 demonstrated the profitability of
the larger retailer R1 being higher than that under symmetric
competition, with R2 having the same profit regardless of
retailer asymmetry. The larger retailer R1 takes full advantage
of its ability to cross-sell by aggressively driving traffic through





Fig. 4. Comparison of the symmetric and asymmetric cases.Empirical Support
The theoretical propositions from our model make several
predictions about retailer price discounting strategies we should
observe in empirical price data. Although online pricing data





Oparameters does not always allow direct tests of individual
propositions. Nevertheless, our model findings do lead to several
testable hypotheses, which if supported can further increase con-
fidence in the model.
The dependent variable of interest is discounted price
observations for best seller items sold by retailers. Price data
for multiple products represent repeated observations of a
mixed pricing strategy over time (e.g., Iyer and Pazgal 2003;
Kocas and Bohlmann 2008; Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal 1990;
Ratchford 2009). A price discount reflects an observed price for
a specific product lower than the item's highest (list) price. We
consider a retailer's average discounting behavior across a set
of best seller items, in our case books.
Both the symmetric and asymmetric models predict that
products with higher traffic generation potential, nN, should be
offered at deeper, more frequent discounts. The traffic generation
potential of any product can be assessed by the sales rank, or
popularity, of the item. Using sales rank as a proxy for traffic
generation potential, we state our first hypothesis:
H1. Products with higher sales rank have a) deeper and b)
more frequent discounts.
Moreover, our (symmetric and asymmetric) models predict
that larger relative basket sizes br lead to deeper, more frequent














































































9C. Kocas et al. / Journal of Interactive Marketing xx (2017) xxx–xxxlow reservation price (list price) on a best seller or a high
relative average basket size. Thus:
H2. Products with lower list prices have a) deeper and b) more
frequent discounts.
H3. Retailers with larger average basket sizes offer a) deeper
and b) more frequent discounts.
To test our hypotheses, we gather three data sets: the first
represents a time series of prices to test H1a (sales rank affects
discount) and H2a (list price affects discount) in a model
accounting for dual causality, the second represents a more
comprehensive cross-sectional data set to test H1a and H2a for
a wide range of best seller sales rank, and the third data set
combines two online book price comparison sites to test H3a
(retailer basket size affects discounts). We formally test our
stated hypotheses only with respect to the depth of promotions,
not frequency of promotions, because of the cross-sectional
nature of our larger data set. The descriptive statistics for the
first two datasets are given in Table 2; descriptive statistics
for the third dataset are presented later in Table 5. In all our
analyses, we standardize book prices with respect to their list
(regular) prices by dividing the current price by the list price.
An observed discount corresponds to any standardized price
less than 1.










CData Set 1: Amazon.com Time Series DataThe first data set runs from June 1, 2011 to Sept 3, 2011, a
total of 3 months, on 7,332 books which were listed under
New releases N coming soon at Amazon.com. The advantage
of this data is that we can observe each book from the start of its
availability. Data were collected on a rolling basis, and include






Summary statistics for the Amazon.com data sets.
Standardized price Sales rank Pub. year # of sellers
Data Set 1: Amazon.com time series data with 7,332 books across 3 months
Valid Obs. 847,405 613,439 847,405 360,369
Missing 0 233.966 0 487,036
Mean .82 1,316,078 2011 20.68
Median .78 529,057 2011 19.00
Std. Dev. .16 1,929,478 0 11.88
Minimum .22 1 2011 1
Maximum 1 10,517,303 2011 111
Data Set 2: Comprehensive Amazon.com data with 819,377 books
Valid Obs. 819,377 819,377 819,377 737,999
Missing 0 0 0 81,378
Mean .93 3,010,871 1999 13.92
Median 1.00 2,163,100 2002 11.00
Std. Dev. .12 2,712,880 9.32 13.61
Minimum .037 14 1913 1
Maximum 1.00 9,999,948 2012 6,045
a A specification omitting Avg. Customer Reviews vastly improves the number of v
present the broader analysis here.








the book (hardcover or not), the average customer review, and
number of sellers.
Analysis of Data Set 1
Our analysis proceeds in the steps of persistence modeling
(Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009) to explicitly analyze
potential dual causality among price and sales rank (H1a).
In the first step, we test for Granger Causality among price
and sales rank. This test only reveals whether one variable
drives another, not the direction (sign) nor magnitude of
this relationship. To this end, we next estimate a vector
autoregression (VAR) model with specification according to the
unit root and cointegration tests. Based on this model, generalized
impulse response functions (GIRF) track the over-time impact
of a change in one variable to the other variables in the model. As
in previous VAR applications (e.g. Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels
2009) we calculate the cumulative elasticity as the sum of all
impulse response coefficients significantly different from zero
at the 95% significance level.
The Granger Causality tests clearly show dual causality
at the p b 0.05 significance level, considering up to 8 lags.
Specifically, sales rank is both driven by and drives list price
and discount at any lag (p b 0.01). Number of sellers also
shows dual causality with both list price and discount at any lag
(p b 0.01), as well as with sales rank (p b 0.01). List price
drives discount at any lag (p b 0.01), although discount does
not Granger cause list price (p N 0.18 for all lags). Number
of sellers is also Granger caused by customer reviews at any
lag (p b 0.02), but the reverse is not supported (p N 0.05). For
customer reviews, dual causality with list price is supported
only for 4 of the 8 tested lags (p b 0.02), while discount drives
customer reviews at any lag (p b 0.02). Customer reviews
Granger cause sales rank only starting lag 5 (p b 0.03), while
sales rank causes customer reviews at any lag (p b 0.03).
Because all variables are mean-stationary (as verified by unitHardcover (1 = yes) List price Ave. customer review Discount
847,405 847,405 366,050 847,405
0 0 481,355 0
.25 34.06 4.21 .18
.00 19.99 4.30 .22
.44 95.20 .58 .16
.00 .00 1.57 .00
1.00 4,271.00 5.00 .78
819,377 819,377 410,207 819,377
0 0 409,170 a 0
.37 37.04 4.23 .067
.00 20.00 4.40 .000
.48 41.97 .81 .12
.00 .39 1.00 .00
1.00 199.99 5.00 .96
alid cases; however, all coefficient signs and significances remain the same. We



























































































t3:4 Response estimate −0.044 −1.631 0.114 0.964 0.009 0.238
t3:5 Standard error 0.003 0.078 0.006 0.095 0.002 0.065Q3
t3:6 Elasticity −0.0005 −0.017 0.0093 0.079 0.0019 0.051








root tests), we specify the VAR model with Discount, Rank,
Sellers, List price and Customer reviews as endogenous
variables (explained by the model), and a constant and physical
format (a dummy with 1 = hardcover) as exogenous variables,





























































































Consistent with the Granger Causality tests, the Schwartz
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) selects 5 daily lags as
the optimal balance between forecasting accuracy and parsi-
mony. At this lag, the VAR-model passes the typical diagnostic
tests (Franses 2005) and explains 97.3% of the variance in sales
rank, 98.6% in customer reviews, 99.9% in list price and 96.6%
in Discount. Table 3 shows the GIRF estimates of interest (both
the same-day effects and the cumulative effects over 30 days)
and their standard errors.
The GIRF of Discount shows that discounts are deeper for
products with a better sales rank (cumulative elasticity = −.017)
in support of H1a. Moreover, discounts are deeper for books
with higher list price (.079) across all sales ranks, counter to
H2a. We discuss this finding in detail in the analysis of the
next data set. Finally, discounts are deeper for books with a
better average customer review (.051). We further analyze these
relations in the next data set.
Data Set 2: Comprehensive Amazon.com Data
The second dataset is cross sectional and has more books
to test H1a and H2a for a wide range of best seller sales rank,
including different bins of the data (i.e. books in the top 103
and the top 105). A web agent collected a random sample
of 2,274,890 ISBN numbers in a 15-day period, ending on
May 14, 2011. We collect the price and sales rank information,
year of publication, number of sellers, the average customer
review, and the physical format of the book. By removing
formats other than paperbacks and hardcover books, items with








prices higher than $200, and books not sold by Amazon.com,
we attain a sample of 819,377 books. Book prices are again
standardized.
We run a linear regression on the whole data set to test H1a
and H2a. We also run linear regressions based on logarithmic
bins to demonstrate that bestseller status and effects on prices
exist not only for the classical bestsellers (i.e. top 103), but also
far down the sales ranks, even into one millionth sales ranks.
Each bin represents a relatively homogeneous set of books
according to sales ranks. The bins are the top 103, 103 to 104,
104 to 105, 105 to 106, and 106 to 107. We want to observe
the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients in the regression
equation:
Discount ¼ αþ β1 Rankþ β2 Year þ β3 Sellers
þþβ3 Hardcover þ β4 List Price
þ β5 Ave:Customer Review þ ε ð5Þ
where Discount = 1 − standardized price, and Hardcover is a
dummy variable (Hardcover = 1).
Analysis of Data Set 2
Results are shown in Table 4. For the control variables
(i.e., year, sellers, hardcover, and average customer review),
we find that newer books are offered at significantly deeper
discounts than older books. Deeper discounts are observed
for books carried by more Amazon sellers, probably because
of heightened competition. Hardcover books are offered at
significantly deeper discounts up to a sales rank of 100,000;
however, this trend reverses between 100,000 and 1 million.
Hardcover books with sales ranks higher than 1 million are
sold at a significantly lower discount than paperbacks. We
discuss this finding subsequently. Also, the higher the average
customer review for a book, the higher is the discount.
We now test H1a and H2a on the basis of this data set. As
the average discount column of the top panel of Table 4 shows,
as well as the negative sign of the Sales Rank parameter in
the overall regression of all books, better-selling books have
significantly deeper discounts, as H1a predicts. The sales rank
coefficients for all bins are significant and negative, in support
of H1a. Best sellers with higher sales ranks have deeper
discounts. The transition to best seller pricing is not discrete, as
prior literature on loss leaders would suggest. Rather, we find
that the prices of all books are affected by their inherent traffic
potential, from the top 1,000 to the 10 millionth-ranked books
in the long tail. The Frequency on Sale column of Table 4 also
suggests that better-selling books are on sale more frequently,







































































Linear regression, based on logarithmic bins.Q4 t4:2
t4:3 Model fit
t4:4 Bin N Average discount Frequency on Sale R2 Adj. R2 d.f. F-value
t4:5 1 to 103 351 38% 97% 0.13 0.114 350 8.53 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:6 103 to 104 3,489 31% 88% 0.066 0.065 3,488 41.19 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:7 104 to 105 29,646 24% 80% 0.058 0.058 29,645 302.99 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:8 105 to 106 162,588 15% 58% 0.168 0.168 162,587 5,455.53 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:9 106 to 107 195,215 4% 15% 0.084 0.084 195,214 2,970.72 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:10 All 391,289 10% 29% 0.228 0.228 391,288 19,285.53 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:11
t4:12 Standardized beta coefficients
t4:13 Bin Constant Sales rankQ5 Year of publication Number of sellers Hardcover List price Ave. cust. review
t4:14 1 to 103 −3.92 ⁎⁎ −.156 ⁎⁎⁎ .120 ⁎⁎ .225 ⁎⁎⁎ .171 ⁎⁎⁎ −.092 ⁎ 0.077
t4:15 103 to 104 −5.08 ⁎⁎⁎ −.131 ⁎⁎⁎ .134 ⁎⁎ .035 ⁎⁎ .161 ⁎⁎⁎ −.096 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.015
t4:16 104 to 105 −4.04 ⁎⁎⁎ −.087 ⁎⁎⁎ .110 ⁎⁎⁎ .120 ⁎⁎⁎ .107 ⁎⁎⁎ .023 ⁎⁎⁎ .019 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:17 105 to 106 −5.38 ⁎⁎⁎ −.168 ⁎⁎⁎ .138 ⁎⁎⁎ .256 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 .148 ⁎⁎⁎ .019 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:18 106 to 107 −3.16 ⁎⁎⁎ −.034 ⁎⁎⁎ .123 ⁎⁎⁎ .181 ⁎⁎⁎ −.027 ⁎⁎⁎ .102 ⁎⁎⁎ .004 ⁎
t4:19 All −5.44 ⁎⁎⁎ −.236 ⁎⁎⁎ .150 ⁎⁎⁎ .251 ⁎⁎⁎ −.019 ⁎⁎⁎ .102 ⁎⁎⁎ .020 ⁎⁎⁎
t4:20 Hypothesis H1a H2a
t4:21 Predicted relationship – –
t4:22 Dependent variable is Discount.3
⁎ p b .10.t4:24
⁎⁎ p b .05.t4:25
⁎⁎⁎ p b .01.t4:26








To test H2a, we examine the coefficient of the list price
considering all books, with additional analysis across the five
bins (Table 4). The effect is significant and as expected for
best-selling books with ranks up to 104. That is, for significant
traffic generators, a lower list price leads to a significantly
deeper discount on the book. However, for books with higher
sales ranks, the effect is reversed. Thus, we find support for
H2a, though only up to a point in the sales rankings. The
hypothesis that products with lower list prices have deeper
discounts is supported only if these products have relatively
significant traffic generation potential. The interplay between
list price and hardcover status depicts a more comprehensive
picture, which we examine next.
In general, retailers discount a hardcover book less and a
book with a higher list price more, as the overall regression
parameters for the hardcover and list price in the last row of
Table 4 confirm. Hardcover books target customers with lower
price sensitivities, so it is not surprising that they are discounted
less. A higher list price also provides more room for discounts
(a given percent discount gives a higher discount value),
given similar absolute cost structures for books; therefore, it
is also not surprising that a book with a higher list price is
discounted more.
The hardcover and list price columns at the bottom panel
of Table 4 reveal a switch of the basis for discounting along
the sales rank. In the long tail of the sales distribution, where
sales ranks are in millions, a book is discounted less if it is
a hardcover and is discounted more if its list price is high.
However, as we show in the first and second rows, where sales
ranks are up to 10,000, a book is discounted more if it is a
hardcover or if its list price is low. Though contradictory to the
general case, this finding is consistent with our model premises.Please cite this article as: Cenk Kocas, et al., Pricing Best Sellers and Trafﬁc Gener
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intmar.2017.09.001EOur model predicts that a book that acts as a traffic generatorshould be discounted heavily, which is true for books in the
top 10,000. Moreover, when we control for list price, hardcover
status is still an attractive attribute, so hardcover books
with high sales ranks could still be offered at significantly
deeper discounts. Although we do not model hardcover status
explicitly in our model, the finding that hardcover books in
the top 10,000 are discounted more is consistent with our
model, given their relative attractiveness and traffic generation
potential. Our previous finding that books with higher average
customer reviews are discounted deeper also resonates with
these results. Overall, these findings provide strong empirical
support for H2a.
Data Set 3:Online Book Price Comparison Sites Data
To test for H3a, we collect data on Amazon.com's top-100
best-selling books on October 18, 2011, from multiple online
retailers. We collect pricing data from 37 retailers in the
three-day period ending with October 20, 2011, from two
book price comparison sites, bookstores.com and addall.com.
Dropping from the list marketplaces, auctions, and used-book
sales, as well as retailers located outside the United States and
those that carried fewer than 30 of the top-100 best-selling
books, we obtained a final list of 19 retailers. Four retailers
in this list are multicategory (MC) retailers (Walmart.com,
Overstock.com, Amazon.com, and buy.com), and the remain-
ing 15 are bookstores. Table 5 lists the 19 retailers and the
average discounts they offered on the top-100 books sold. The
four MC retailers fill the top spots with average discounts
of 45%–48%. Bookstores occupy the remaining spots with





































Retailers' top-100 best-selling books statistics.t5:2
t5:3 Rank Retailer Format Average discount Std. Dev. Minimum discount Maximum discount Number of top-100 books on sale
t5:4 1 Wal-Mart Multicategory 48.2% 7.6% 28.0% 82.2% 98
t5:5 2 Overstock.com Multicategory 47.9% 7.8% 27.4% 67.9% 96
t5:6 3 Amazon.com Multicategory 47.8% 7.5% 33.3% 82.2% 99
t5:7 4 Buy.com Multicategory 44.9% 7.5% 30.9% 84.8% 99
t5:8 5 Barnes & Noble Bookstore 44.5% 9.3% 0.0% 82.2% 98
t5:9 6 Alibris Bookstore 44.1% 12.4% 2.9% 71.2% 92
t5:10 7 AbeBooks Bookstore 41.8% 13.8% 0.0% 66.5% 89
t5:11 8 Books-A-Million Bookstore 35.4% 14.2% 0.0% 80.6% 99
t5:12 9 ValoreBooks.com Bookstore 35.2% 14.7% 0.0% 64.2% 85
t5:13 10 TextbookX Bookstore 31.5% 9.5% 10.0% 58.6% 83
t5:14 11 Book Byte Bookstore 28.0% 7.6% 11.7% 55.6% 77
t5:15 12 Better World Books Bookstore 26.2% 13.9% 0.0% 60.6% 88
t5:16 13 Strand Bookstore Bookstore 25.0% 20.6% 0.0% 71.0% 59
t5:17 14 Bookstores.com Bookstore 24.4% 13.7% 0.0% 59.8% 65
t5:18 15 TextbooksRus Bookstore 22.4% 8.2% 6.5% 45.4% 89
t5:19 16 Borders Bookstore 22.2% 18.0% 0.0% 77.9% 96
t5:20 17 BiggerBooks Bookstore 21.5% 10.6% 2.0% 74.8% 99
t5:21 18 eCampus Bookstore 19.9% 10.8% 0.0% 74.2% 99

























Analysis of Data Set 3
We run paired samples t-tests to determine whether the
average prices of MC retailers are lower than those of
bookstores, as our model would predict. The t-values and
corresponding significance levels appear in Table 6. With
4 MC retailers (columns in Table 6) and 15 bookstores (rows in
Table 6), there are 60 comparison pairs; as the t-values show,
the MC retailer prices are significantly lower for 58 of these 60
pairs. Thus, we find significant support for H3a (χ2 = 52.26,
p b .01); retailers with larger average basket sizes offer sig-
nificantly deeper discounts. Table 5 also presents the number
of books available on sale for each retailer that are among
the top-100 books sold by Amazon.com. If we consider the
percentage of books available for sale in the top 100 as a proxy





















Paired t-test results of comparisons of multicategory retailer prices with
bookstore prices.
Walmart.com Overstock.com Amazon.com Buy.com
Barnes & Noble 6.44⁎⁎⁎ 5.15⁎⁎⁎ 5.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.40
Alibris 2.26⁎⁎ 2.30⁎⁎ 2.12⁎⁎ 1.53
AbeBooks 2.95⁎⁎⁎ 3.88⁎⁎⁎ 2.85⁎⁎⁎ 2.07⁎⁎
Books-A-Million 7.29⁎⁎⁎ 7.17⁎⁎⁎ 6.76⁎⁎⁎ 5.75⁎⁎⁎
ValoreBooks.com 4.35⁎⁎⁎ 8.11⁎⁎⁎ 4.30⁎⁎⁎ 3.50⁎⁎⁎
TextbookX 19.93⁎⁎⁎ 15.02⁎⁎⁎ 19.14⁎⁎⁎ 14.28⁎⁎⁎
Book Byte 21.65⁎⁎⁎ 15.81⁎⁎⁎ 20.57⁎⁎⁎ 15.79⁎⁎⁎
Better World Books 6.47⁎⁎⁎ 6.42⁎⁎⁎ 6.13⁎⁎⁎ 6.06⁎⁎⁎
Strand Bookstore 7.27⁎⁎⁎ 7.27⁎⁎⁎ 7.55⁎⁎⁎ 6.46⁎⁎⁎
Bookstores.com 6.61⁎⁎⁎ 13.19⁎⁎⁎ 6.58⁎⁎⁎ 5.82⁎⁎⁎
TextbooksRus 42.45⁎⁎⁎ 27.65⁎⁎⁎ 40.03⁎⁎⁎ 31.11⁎⁎⁎
Borders 13.75⁎⁎⁎ 12.12⁎⁎⁎ 13.52⁎⁎⁎ 12.52⁎⁎⁎
BiggerBooks 26.21⁎⁎⁎ 21.07⁎⁎⁎ 22.87⁎⁎⁎ 22.52⁎⁎⁎
eCampus 26.38⁎⁎⁎ 21.43⁎⁎⁎ 23.15⁎⁎⁎ 22.99⁎⁎⁎
Powell's Books 23.36⁎⁎⁎ 20.16⁎⁎⁎ 21.26⁎⁎⁎ 21.53⁎⁎⁎
Notes: Multicategory retailer prices are lower than bookstores' prices at
⁎p b .10, ⁎⁎p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎p b .01.
Please cite this article as: Cenk Kocas, et al., Pricing Best Sellers and Trafﬁc Gener
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intmar.2017.09.001E
D
 Pan equal number of books, 7 have more books sold by the
bookseller than the MC retailer, and 45 pairs have more books
sold by the MC retailer than the bookseller. A chi-square test
for frequencies (grouping 8 pairs with an equal number of
books with 7 pairs against H3b versus 45 pairs for H3b) shows
that MC retailers carry significantly more books in the top 100
than booksellers (χ2 = 15, p b .01), consistent with H3b. Given
their larger basket sizes, the MC retailers also carry more best
seller products to increase their cross-selling efforts.
The data sets provide empirical support for the findings
from our theoretical model, supporting all of our hypothesized
relationships for discount depth. Our empirical work shows
that books with higher sales ranks have deeper discounts, and
this relationship holds farther down the best seller list. Books
with lower list prices also have deeper discounts, though this
relationship does not hold farther down the best seller list. We
also show that larger basket size (multicategory) retailers offer
deeper discounts on the top best sellers, as our opening example
suggests.
Discussion
In this research we set out to examine how profit-maximizing
online retailers should price traffic generators in a competitive
market. Our analytical model treats traffic generation potential
as a continuous variable and is unique in differentiating and
modeling attraction (traffic generation potential), cross-selling
(conversion incidence), and the effects of promotions when the
best seller is included in a larger shopping basket (inclusion
incidence). Uncovering the tensions of this linkage between
the motivation to lower prices of traffic generators and the
motivation to increase their prices in anticipation of higher-
margin basket incidences is a unique contribution of our model.
We show that the frequency and the depth of discounts are
higher for products with higher conversion-to-inclusion ratios,
such as seasonal items or best-selling books. Our empiricalators: The Role of Asymmetric Cross-selling, Journal of Interactive Marketing
